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Arroyo: Deprived of My Right to Counsel

NOT SO FAST: I HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF MY RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Griffin1
(decided April 2, 2013)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment2 of the United States Constitution provides the accused with the right to assistance of counsel for his or her
defense in all criminal trials.3 In People v. Griffin, the New York
Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of whether the defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel when he
pled guilty to two counts of robbery.4 The heart of the matter in this
case arose from the trial court’s interference with the attorney-client
relationship when it dismissed Defendant’s counsel, the Legal Aid
Society.5 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department held that interference with an attorney-client relationship
had the possibility of upsetting the framework of the trial process.6
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s
decision and held that choice of counsel and right to counsel claims
were close enough because a deprivation of counsel error can affect a
person’s choice of counsel.7 Since the deprivation of counsel error
affected the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, the right to
counsel claim was not forfeited by the guilty plea.8
1

987 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
Id.
4
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283.
5
Id. at 284.
6
People v. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011).
7
See Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285-86 (reasoning that the Gonzalez-Lopez analysis applies in
this case because the deprivation of counsel claim can affect the right to choice of counsel).
8
Id. at 286.
2
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The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s
deprivation of counsel claim was analogous to the constitutional right
to counsel and survived a guilty plea.9 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,10 where
the Court stated, “the choice of attorney will affect whether and on
what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial.”11 A deprivation of counsel
error can have a great effect on the outcome of a trial because all
lawyers pursue different strategies that can lead to different results.12
If a defendant is deprived of counsel, he then loses the opportunity to
provide himself with a defense of his choosing, and this can lead to a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.13
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, Anthony Griffin, was charged with firstdegree robbery and attempted first-degree robbery.14 In the fivemonth period following arraignment on the robbery charges, there
were multiple adjournments requested by both the district attorneys
and the Legal Aid Society.15 The court granted an adjournment to the
People for the assignment of a new Assistant District Attorney; in
one instance, the court even granted an adjournment when the ADA
admittedly had not yet met with all of the witnesses.16
On another occasion, when the case was set for hearing and
trial, the ADA stated that the People were not ready and asked for
another adjournment.17 At the same time, Legal Aid counsel informed the trial court that its attorney would be leaving the Legal Aid
Society, and requested a control date so a new Legal Aid attorney
could be assigned.18 The trial court declined the request for the control date and requested the assignment of another attorney for the trial
9

Id. at 285.
548 U.S. 140 (2006).
11
Id. at 150 (stating the choice of attorney is crucial in the trial process because every attorney has a different strategy that can dramatically affect the outcome of a trial).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
10

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/18

2

Arroyo: Deprived of My Right to Counsel

2014]

DEPRIVED OF MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1201

slated to take place in fifteen days.19
The Legal Aid Society argued for an adjournment because it
was not going to be ready for trial due to the nature of the case and
the fact that the defendant was a persistent felon.20 Furthermore, Legal Aid added, “if the court believed they should be relieved, then the
court should go right ahead and relieve them.”21 The court rejected
the request for an adjournment and relieved Legal Aid as counsel.22
After the assignment of 18-B counsel to the defendant, the
case was reassigned to another judge.23 The defendant pled guilty to
first-degree robbery and first-degree attempted robbery for a sentence
of concurrent terms of twenty years to life.24 The defendant filed two
pro se motions seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to have new
counsel assigned to him.25 The court denied the motions and proceeded with the sentencing.26
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, in a 3-2 decision, reversed the conviction and remanded
the case, holding the discharge of the defendant’s Legal Aid counsel
without consulting the defendant interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.27 The appellate court found both parties were
treated differently, especially when the People enjoyed the accommodation of numerous adjournments.28

19

Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 283-84.
23
Id. at 284.
24
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. The dissent in People v. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) argued regardless of the broad discretion exercised in the handling of the calendar, the trial
court properly relieved the Legal Aid Society and did not interfere with the attorney-client
relationship. Griffin, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Sweeny, J., dissenting). The dissent based its
conclusion on the fact that after the Legal Aid was relieved, Defendant entered the plea
agreement with the assistance of his assigned 18-B counsel. Id. at 400. Thus, according to
the dissent, there was no improper removal of the Legal Aid attorney or an interference with
the attorney-client relationship; if the deprivation of counsel error violated Defendant’s right
to choice of counsel, it was cured by the assignment of 18-B counsel. Id. at 399.
20
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ISSUES IN GRIFFIN THAT LED THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
APPLY THE GONZALEZ-LOPEZ RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
CHOICE ANALYSIS

In affirming the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals examined a set of issues that, together, determined whether interference
with the attorney-client relationship was sufficient grounds for a deprivation of counsel claim to survive a guilty plea.29 The first issue
was whether a deprivation of counsel claim was forfeited by a guilty
plea.30 The second most crucial issue was whether judicial interference with an attorney-client relationship was justified.31 Finally, the
court was obliged to draw a distinction between a deprivation of
counsel claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.32
First, the Court of Appeals looked at the overall issue of
whether the defendant’s deprivation of counsel claim was forfeited
when he pled guilty.33 In determining that it was not, the court relied
on People v. Taylor,34 which clearly pointed out there is no established rule to determine when a claim is waived.35 Rather, the court
must look to whether the claim is related to a factual matter or a fundamental matter that can affect the trial process.36 People v. Hansen37
explained that “[t]he critical distinction is between defects implicating the integrity of the process, which may survive a guilty plea, and
less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical matters,
which do not.”38 Thus, certain claims have the potential to survive a
guilty plea, especially claims that are intertwined with the integrity of
the criminal justice system and affect the constitutional rights of a defendant.39 Since the defendant’s constitutional rights were affected,
29
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d 284 (examining three issues that eventually led the court to analyze
the scope of the judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship).
30
Id. at 284.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 285.
33
Id. at 284.
34
478 N.E.2d 755 (N.Y. 1985).
35
Id. at 757.
36
Id.
37
738 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 2000).
38
Id. at 776 (pointing out that a defect or error has to be of such magnitude that it affects
the integrity of the trial process, in order for it to possibly reverse a guilty plea).
39
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284. The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s notion that
Gonzalez-Lopez only applies to defendants who finance their own counsel or are not assigned counsel. Id. at 285. The Griffin court reasons, “the right to counsel claim is inextricably intertwined with claims of different treatment in a way that we believe meaningfully
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the court then analyzed whether the judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship was justified.40
Second, the Court of Appeals examined the most critical issue
at trial, which was whether the trial court’s interference with the attorney-client relationship was justified.41 This was an issue because
“courts cannot arbitrarily interfere with the attorney-client relationship, and interference with that relationship for purpose of case management is not without limits, and is subject to scrutiny.”42 Furthermore, judicial interference with an attorney-client relationship, by a
removal of counsel that disparately impacts defense counsel, goes to
the fundamental fairness of the system of justice.43 Even though the
removal of the Legal Aid Society in Griffin was due to concerns
about the efficient administration of the criminal justice system,
courts may still face some scrutiny if there is interference with the attorney-client relationship.44
The court’s interference with the attorney-client relationship
was scrutinized in People v. Knowles,45 when the trial court refused
to permit an additional Legal Aid attorney to cross-examine a witness
and sit at the defense table.46 The trial court justified its denial of
counsel by claiming that the defendant, a black male, was trying to
gain a strategic advantage with the jury by having a black female attorney.47 Denying the defendant the assistance of the additional attorney opened up the discussion of whether the judicial interference
with the attorney-client relationship affected the defendant’s right to
choice of counsel.48 The trial court could not support its ruling with
any findings of delay or disruptions of proceedings, conflict of inter-

places it outside the sphere of claims forfeited by a guilty plea, and implicates the entire
criminal justice system.” Id. at 286 n.2. This is how the Court of Appeals is able to apply
Gonzalez-Lopez when the Defendant was assigned counsel.
40
Id. at 284-85.
41
Id. at 284.
42
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 284.
43
Id.
44
Id. (citing People v. Knowles, 673 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1996), and explaining that judicial
interference with an attorney-client relationship for the purpose of case management is still
subject to scrutiny).
45
673 N.E.2d 902, 907 (N.Y. 1996) (reasoning that racial discrimination is never a valid
basis to support the trial judge’s discretion in declining the addition of a second attorney).
46
Id. at 903.
47
Id. at 904.
48
Id. at 904-05.
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est, or prejudice to the prosecution or defense.49 Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court’s exclusion of the attorney was arbitrary and was an abuse of discretion because there was no rational basis to support the ruling.50
Finally, the Court of Appeals handled the issue of whether
deprivation of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel claims
had the same legal equivalence with respect to the defendant’s plea.51
The Court of Appeals distinguished the two claims by comparing the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in People v. Petgen52 to the
deprivation of choice of counsel claim in Griffin.53
In Petgen, the defendant, with his new attorney, was forced to
file an untimely application for permission to file a motion to suppress evidence because his original attorney did not respond to the
prosecution’s notice of intention to offer evidence.54 The trial judge
denied the defendant’s application.55 The defendant claimed that this
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel claim that should have
survived his guilty plea.56 Because his new attorney was aware of the
ineffectiveness of the previous counsel, the right to appellate review
was forfeited.57 The court reasoned that the application for permission to file a motion and a motion to suppress evidence should be
treated differently.58 The application for permission to file a motion
was based on whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
file the motion on time; it was not based on the denial of merits of
constitutional contentions that a motion to suppress evidence would
be.59 Thus, the court concluded that the ineffectiveness of counsel
claim did not infect the plea and the claim could not survive the
guilty plea.60
In contrast, the deprivation of counsel in Griffin infected the
49

Id. at 905.
Knowles, 673 N.E.2d at 906.
51
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285.
52
435 N.E.2d 669 (N.Y. 1982).
53
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285. The Court of Appeals rejects the People’s application of
Petgen because the deprivation of counsel infected the guilty plea in Griffin. Id. In contrast,
the ineffective assistance of counsel in Petgen did not infect the plea. Id.
54
Petgen, 435 N.E.2d at 670.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 669.
57
Id. at 671.
58
Id. at 670.
59
Petgen, 435 N.E.2d at 670.
60
Id. at 670-71.
50
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plea and the plea bargaining process, both of which the Legal Aid
Society was actively engaged in prior to its removal.61 This is why
the court in Griffin drew a distinction between the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Petgen and the deprivation of counsel claim
in Griffin.62 Therefore, after analyzing this issue, the court in Griffin
was able to determine the significance of the choice of counsel in the
plea process, and apply the Gonzalez-Lopez analysis.63
IV.

THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF GONZALEZ-LOPEZ IN GRIFFIN

In examining whether the removal of Legal Aid without consulting with the defendant in Griffin interfered with his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals relied on United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, which emphasized that the choice of attorney can have a great effect on the outcome of a trial.64 In GonzalezLopez, the United States Supreme Court held that an erroneous disqualification of counsel error that violates the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel does warrant a conviction reversal because the error is a
“structural defect.”65
The defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez was charged with conspiracy to distribute one hundred kilograms of marijuana.66 The defendant’s family hired an attorney, and after the arraignment, the defendant hired a second attorney to represent him in addition to his original
attorney.67 The trial court provisionally allowed the participation of
the second attorney.68 The second attorney violated a court rule, and
the court removed him from the trial.69 The defendant’s original attorney filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as well as a motion for
sanctions against the second attorney.70 The defendant, left with no
attorney, hired a local attorney.71
In essence, the Court was concerned with how the trial court’s
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 285.
Id.
Id.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
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application of the court rules affected the defendant’s right to choice
of counsel.72 While the trial court was within its discretion in using
the court rules to discipline the second attorney, enforcement of the
court rules by the trial court interfered with the defendant’s right to
choice of counsel.73 The Court then had to determine whether the interference could potentially affect the framework of the trial process.74 If it did, the error would constitute a “structural defect,”
which would not require a showing of prejudice by the defendant.75
Moreover, the error would not be subject to a “harmless error” analysis.76
V.

WHAT IS A “STRUCTURAL DEFECT” ERROR?

Constitutional errors are divided into two categories.77 The
first error is a “trial error,” which occurs during the presentation of
the case to the jury.78 These errors can be assessed collectively to determine if they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.79 The second type of error is called a “structural defect,” which affects the
framework in which the trial proceeds.80 Erroneous deprivation of
counsel that interferes with a defendant’s right to choice of counsel is
a structural defect because attorneys have differing strategies that can
take a trial in many different directions, thus, drastically affecting the
outcome of a trial.81
When the right to be assisted by counsel of choice is wrongly
denied, the court must first determine if it should review the error for
harmlessness.82 In order to determine whether an error is reviewable
for harmlessness, the court must determine what category the consti72

Id. at 148. “Deprivation of the right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously
prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the
representation he received.” Id.
73
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152.
74
Id. at 150.
75
Id. at 148. “These ‘defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards’ because they ‘affec[t]
the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and are not ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Id.
76
Id.
77
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 150.
82
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148.
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tutional error falls into.83 If there is a structural defect, it will circumvent the harmlessness analysis because interference with the right
to counsel can greatly affect the framework of the trial process.84
Hence, a defendant does not have to show prejudice when there is a
structural defect error because it would be unsound for courts to review counsel strategies and trial outcomes in the alternative.85 Therefore, in situations where the deprivation of counsel by a court interferes with an attorney-client relationship or the right to choice of
counsel, the defendant will not have the burden of showing prejudice.
If there is a structural defect error that affects the framework
of the trial process, the court can provide justification for such an error. To the contrary, the trial court in United States v. Smith86 was
unable to justify the structural defect error when the defendant asked
to substitute his attorney.87 The substitute attorney informed the
court that he would not be able to make the trial date due to a racket-

83

Id.
Id. at 148-49.
85
Id. at 150.
The Government acknowledges that the deprivation of choice of counsel
pervades the entire trial, but points out that counsel's ineffectiveness may
also do so and yet we do not allow reversal of a conviction for that reason without a showing of prejudice. But the requirement of showing
prejudice in ineffectiveness claims stems from the very definition of the
right at issue; it is not a matter of showing that the violation was harmless, but of showing that a violation of the right to effective representation occurred. A choice-of-counsel violation occurs whenever the defendant's choice is wrongfully denied. Moreover, if and when counsel's
ineffectiveness “pervades” a trial, it does so (to the extent we can detect
it) through identifiable mistakes. We can assess how those mistakes affected the outcome. To determine the effect of wrongful denial of
choice of counsel, however, we would not be looking for mistakes committed by the actual counsel, but for differences in the defense that
would have been made by the rejected counsel—in matters ranging from
questions asked on voir dire and cross-examination to such intangibles
as argument style and relationship with the prosecutors. We would have
to speculate upon what matters the rejected counsel would have handled
differently—or indeed, would have handled the same but with the benefit of a more jury-pleasing courtroom style or a longstanding relationship
of trust with the prosecutors. And then we would have to speculate upon
what effect those different choices or different intangibles might have
had. The difficulties of conducting the two assessments of prejudice are
not remotely comparable.
Id. at 150-51.
86
618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010).
87
Id. at 659.
84
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eering trial that would last several months.88 The trial court denied
the motion to substitute counsel and appointed an attorney for the defendant.89 The defendant was also denied the assistance of his original attorney.90 Eventually, the defendant pled guilty with the assistance of a court appointed attorney.91
It is apparent in Smith that in order for a Sixth Amendment
claim to survive a guilty plea, the defendant must first show that his
substantial rights were affected when he was deprived of counsel.92
The deprivation of counsel error must have a significant effect on the
fairness of the proceedings.93 The defendant in Smith was deprived
of the counsel of his choice when the court denied him his substitution of counsel motion.94 The trial court could not justify that it was
balancing the rights to counsel of choice and the needs for fairness
against the calendar because there was no trial date on schedule at the
time.95 Moreover, the defendant was not trying to manipulate the
schedule because a trial date was not yet set.96 Therefore, the court
concluded that the deprivation of counsel was a structural defect error
and that the defendant’s guilty plea was withdrawn.97
VI.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE “STRUCTURAL DEFECT” ERROR

Courts can interfere with an attorney-client relationship in the
name of trial management when there is a possibility of a conflict of
interest or when there is a possibility of a delay in proceedings.98
Similarly, in New York, the courts have recognized these exceptions
as stated in Knowles:
Accordingly, judicial interference with an established
88

Id. at 660.
Id. at 661.
90
Id.
91
Smith, 618 F.3d at 662.
92
Id. at 664 (concluding that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
93
Id. at 666. It is noted on the record that the trial court said the defendant did not have a
right to choice of counsel, he only had a right of counsel. Id. Since this is inconsistent with
Gonzalez-Lopez, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals believes that the trial court did not
give sufficient consideration to the right to choice of counsel. Id.
94
Smith, 618 F.3d at 661.
95
Id. at 666.
96
Id. at 666-67.
97
Id. at 667.
98
Knowles, 673 N.E.2d at 905.
89
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attorney-client relationship in the name of trial management may be tolerable only where the court first
determines that counsel’s participation presents a conflict of interest or where defense tactics may compromise the orderly management of the trial or the fair
administration of justice.99
Additionally, the court can also justify its interference by
showing prejudice to the prosecution or the defense.100 Therefore, on
the New York and federal levels, there exist exceptions that can justify judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship.
United States v. Sanchez Guerrero101 examines the conflict of
interest exception. In Sanchez Guerrero, the defendant was indicted
for conspiring with others to distribute cocaine and marijuana and
shared the same attorney as his co-conspirators.102 The defendant
was also later indicted for possession of a firearm as a felon and engaging in a RICO conspiracy.103 The district court disqualified the
defendant’s defense counsel because of a conflict of interest. 104 The
attorney was disqualified because he represented Guerrero, Guerrero’s brother, and a witness as co-defendants.105 The defendant ultimately pled guilty to the RICO charge.106 In his plea agreement, the
defendant did not preserve any of his rights to appeal and he waived
his right to appeal any sentencing issues.107 The defendant then appealed his conviction and claimed his counsel should not have been
disqualified.108
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the GonzalezLopez rationale, even though the Sanchez Guerrero case involved a
guilty plea as opposed to a trial.109 Because choice of counsel seriously impacted the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, disqualifica99

Id. at 904.
Id.
101
546 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2008).
102
Id. at 330.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 331.
105
Id.
106
Sanchez Guerrero, 546 F.3d at 331.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 332. “If a defendant is erroneously denied the counsel of his choice, it is a structural error in the trial that brings into question the voluntary and intelligent character of the
guilty plea itself.” Id.
100
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tion of counsel, in this case, was considered a “structural error.”110
Citing a conflict of interest as a reason for disqualifying the
defendant’s counsel, the federal district court reasoned a conflict of
interest would have still existed even if the disqualified counsel hired
an attorney to cross-examine the witness he was representing.111 Although the trial court interfered with the attorney-client relationship,
the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
disqualifying counsel because there was an actual conflict of interest
in the case.112 Thus, in instances of conflicts of interest, a court’s interference with an attorney-client relationship must strike a balance
between the rights of the parties involved and the appearance of fairness in a trial.113
The other exception of compromising the orderly management of trial and the fair administration of justice was evident in
United States v. Konstantin,114 when the defendant, displeased with
his counsel, was denied an adjournment that would have allowed him
to seek new counsel.115 The defendant requested an adjournment to
postpone his trial.116 The defendant wanted to discharge his current
counsel and postpone the trial for another week, when his counsel of
choice would be available.117 The trial court denied the defendant’s
request for adjournment citing reasons of scheduling.118
The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision and reasoned a trial court has wide latitude
in balancing the right of choice of counsel against the demands of its
calendar.119 It is obvious that the defendant had an attorney-client relationship because the defendant’s knowledge of his purported new
counsel’s trial availability.120 The trial court’s interference with the
attorney-client relationship, in this case, was justified because there
was the possibility the proceedings would be delayed if the adjourn-

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id.
Sanchez Guerrero, 546 F.3d at 334.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 333.
280 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Konstantin, 280 F. App’x at 55.
Id.
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ment were granted to the defendant.121 Furthermore, it was also reasonable to surmise that granting the trial adjournment would prejudice the prosecution because they would have very little time to adjust their tactics to a new defense attorney’s strategies.122
VII.

CONCLUSION

The defendant in Griffin was prejudiced when the trial court
granted adjournments to the People.123 Even though the trial court
had wide latitude of discretion in managing its calendar, the adjournments to the People still deprived the defendant of his right to
counsel.124 In this situation, the interference with the attorney-client
relationship for case management purposes was subject to scrutiny.125
Legal Aid was very active in the plea bargaining process, and this
was sufficent to establish an interference with the attorney-client relationship.126 The judicial interference had such an effect on the fairness of the trial process that the defendant’s right to counsel claim
survived his guilty plea.127
Errors affecting constitutional rights, such as violations of a
defendant’s right to counsel, may survive a guilty plea because they
go to the very heart of the trial process.128 The New York courts have
two categories for these constitutional errors.129 An error such as
deprivation of counsel that interferes with an attorney-client relationship that affects the right to choice of counsel and could compromise
the integrity of the trial process is an error that has the capability of
reversing a guilty plea.130 On the other hand, “less fundamental

121

Id.
Id. (stating that these types of cases normally do not require a forensic account).
Bringing in a new attorney as well as a forensic expert under such short notice can prejudice
the prosecution. Konstantin does not discuss the prejudice to the prosecution if the motion to
substitute counsel would have been allowed, but it seems to be implied in the case.
123
Griffin, 987 N.E.2d at 283.
124
Id. at 284.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 285.
127
Id.
128
Hansen, 738 N.E.2d at 776.
129
Id. “The critical distinction is between defects implicating the integrity of the process,
which may survive a guilty plea, and less fundamental flaws, such as evidentiary or technical
matters, which do not.” Id.
130
Id. at 777 (implying that the defendant’s claim did not survive the guilty plea because
the trial error did not affect the heart of the trial process).
122
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flaws” like evidentiary or technical matters, do not compromise the
integrity of the process and are forfeited by a guilty plea.131
The New York and federal courts employ the same process in
determining whether a deprivation of counsel claim survives a guilty
plea.132 Interference with the attorney-client relationship is the critical component in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel analysis.133
New York and federal courts categorically label their constitutional
errors that affect trials in the same fashion.134 Therefore, in employing the same analysis for Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations, both courts are able to properly evaluate whether such claims
can survive a guilty plea.
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